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Minimum income protection and social assistance is the last-resort safety net of the welfare state, 
targeted to the most vulnerable groups in society. Poverty alleviation is thus one chief objective 
of such benefits. Whether this objective is fulfilled is continuously discussed and debated. This 
paper provide new evidence on this issue and offers an analysis of social assistance benefit levels 
in 16 industrialized welfare democracies over the period 1990-2000. It is shown that the period 
1990-1995 was characterized primarily by stagnated benefit levels, while in the latter half of the 
1990s benefits declined. In most countries, social assistance fails to provide income above the 
poverty threshold, something that makes it difficult to view these benefits as effective 
redistributive instruments.  
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Social Research, the Swedish Research Council, and Riksbankens jubileumsfond (RJ). 
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It is widely recognized that receipt of social assistance nowadays often is conditional on work-
related activities. It is less well acknowledged that this conditionality of social assistance is 
accompanied by benefit curtailments, either deliberately induced by governments or due to the 
insufficient updating of benefits. Workfare is therefore not only about work activities for the 
involuntarily unemployed, as is commonly believed; it also involves a downsizing of benefits 
and the introduction of incentives to take on even low-paid employment. These changes in the 
content of social citizenship may not only have had profound consequences for poverty 
alleviation but may also have helped to make societies more unjust, with a severely weakened 
right of reasonable access to a decent minimum income.   
  Deciding exactly what a decent minimum income should be is by no means 
straightforward. Although the aim of poverty alleviation is central to most industrialized welfare 
democracies (Ringen, 1987: 141), governments differ in aspiration and welfare efforts (Veit-
Wilson, 1998). However, it is necessary to agree on some yardstick against which welfare 
policies can be compared and evaluated. In this paper I will use the relative definition of poverty 
adopted by the European Union to evaluate whether social assistance guarantees an income level 
compatible with an egalitarian and liberal understanding of social justice. In so doing I will 
examine the adequacy of social assistance, i.e. whether benefits are provided at levels above the 
poverty threshold.  
  Large-scale and systematic analyses of social assistance benefit levels have been very 
difficult to carry out, mainly because of the lack of good quality institutional data. For this reason 
I have established a new macro-level dataset of social assistance benefits, which gives 
exceptional opportunities to study social assistance both from a longitudinal and a comparative 
perspective. A further aspect of this dataset is that it includes indicators of the financial situation   3
of lone parents. Since the majority of the latter are mothers, it brings issues of the gendering 
welfare state to the forefront of analysis. Questions concerning the equal treatment of men and 
women have become increasingly important given the greater conditionality of social assistance, 
which is often based on pre-conceptions about a full adult worker model family.  
  The adequacy of social assistance indicates how far up the income scale benefits reach and 
whether payments are provided at levels sufficient to reduce poverty. This measurement of social 
assistance adequacy rates may not necessarily correspond to the yardstick used by national 
governments to define income adequacy, nor is it claimed to capture whether income levels are 
enough for social participation and inclusion in different countries. Such assessments are beyond 
this study to explore. Rather, the social assistance adequate rates analyzed in this paper indicate 
how social assistance performs in relation to European poverty standards and the way in which 
poverty generally is approached in the comparative welfare state literature. Here, we combine 
into one theoretical and empirical framework two strands of welfare state research that are often 
conducted separately: institutional macro-level analyses of the organization of social policy, and 
outcome-related micro-level analyses of income distributions. This combination of different 
types of data and perspectives will give us a better understanding of anti-poverty strategies. 
Along with more traditional studies of poverty alleviation it complements information about the 
redistributive welfare state. 
   The present paper is structured as follows. Firstly, I relate ideas of justice to poverty 
alleviation, after which I discuss how workfare and gender may contribute to our understanding 
of the relationship between social assistance and poverty. These passages are followed by two 
methodological and data sections. After the presentation of the results, the paper concludes with 
a discussion of the main findings.     4
 
Just societies and social minimums 
Social minimums are central to the achievement of just societies. However, social minimums are 
not vital for distributive justice primarily because of its leveling effects on the overall 
distribution of wealth and income; universal and earnings-related social insurance provisions that 
tend to have greater impact on aggregate poverty and inequality rates (Nelson, 2004). The 
importance of social minimums has more to do with its capacity to mitigate severe income 
shortfalls among citizens who lack work income and fall through the net of first-tier provisions.
1 
In his theory of justice, Rawls (1971) argues that in just societies where institutions are organized 
to maximize the lifetime expectations of the most disadvantaged typical person, the social 
minimum guarantees that the short-term basic needs of citizens are satisfied. This is the second 
principle of justice (the difference principle) formulated by Rawls (1971). The first principle 
concerns the guaranteeing of equal basic liberties. In as much as social minimums provide the 
individual resources necessary to realize political and civil rights, the guaranteeing of a social 
minimum has priority over the first principle of justice (Schaller, 1998).  
  Rawls does not detail how social minimums should be construed, except that he refers to 
the possibility of using some kind of graded negative income tax (Rawls, 1971: 275). The 
original concept of a negative income tax, elaborated by Friedman (1962) in the early 1960s, has 
not yet been realized at national level in any industrialized welfare democracy. Neither is there 
any other form of refined state governed guaranteed flat rate minimum income or basic income 
                                                 
1 Social assistance may have other functions besides providing cash support to low-income households, such as 
giving access to shelter, protection against domestic violence, treatment for drug-abuse, family counseling, and so 
forth. Although there are strong associations between household income and problems or insufficiencies in other 
level of living areas (Korpi et al., 2007), theses additional social service functions may more appropriately be 
evaluated on the basis of Sen’s (1985) capability approach, rather than on the basis of benefit adequacy and the 
social minimums discussed by Rawls (1971), below. Social services are not discussed in this text.   5
at operation in these countries. There is a lively debate among researchers about the construction 
of such basic incomes (see Haveman, 1988; Parker, 1989; van Parijs, 1995; Barry, 1996; 
Walters, 1997; Fitzpatrick, 1999; Murray, 2006),
2 although the impact of this debate on actual 
policy-making seems to have been limited. Perhaps the closest we get to a social minimum is 
social assistance, which at least in some respects resembles the type of social minimum 
discussed by Rawls (1971). The social minimum belongs to the transfer branch and involves 
cash payments from the state or local governments. Social assistance often defines the minimum 
income standard offered by a state or a local government. Benefits are generally designed to 
cater for a broad range of individual needs, and social assistance programs are more or less 
exclusively designed to assist the most disadvantaged citizens. The trend towards more active 
approaches to delivering cash benefits also indicates that social assistance is increasingly viewed 
as a temporary rather than long-term form of financial support.  
  Whether work obligations on welfare recipients are compatible with the basic requirements 
of a just social minimum is not always clear from the most recent debate about social assistance. 
Rawls (1971) was also somewhat reluctant to discuss the work-related aspects of the social 
minimum in greater detail. Nonetheless, he did seem to endorse some kind of fairness-based 
work-ethic, according to which everyone should contribute to the total amount of labor produced 
(White 2004). In this light, greater work obligations could well be regarded as compatible with 
just societies. However, the exact institutional prerequisites that have to be fulfilled for a fair 
work-test to apply are continuously subject to debate. I will now discuss in more detail how the 
growing conditionality of social assistance may interfere with the establishment of just social 
                                                 
2 There are certainly several reasons why governments seem to be unwilling to implement an unconditional 
guaranteed basic income for all citizens. One such reason is probably the relationship between basic income and 
work incentive, which may prove to be negative. This potential unintended effect of social policy is also recognized 
in much of the basic income literature.     6
minimums.      
 
Active welfare and Social Justice 
The activation of social assistance recipients in recent decades has intensified the ongoing 
discussion about the construction of just societies. In both Western Europe and in the Anglo-
Saxon welfare states working age recipients are nowadays often required to take on job-related 
activities, whether in the form of job search, education, training, or actual work. LØdemel and 
Trickey (2001), for example, argue that this development has introduced important changes in 
the way social assistance is provided. During the period of welfare state growth in the 1950s and 
up to the mid 1980s, activation policy was generally targeted at citizens covered by 
unemployment insurance. Since the early 1990s, however, obligations to participate in job-
related activities are particularly pronounced in connection with social assistance (Handler, 
2004). We may here distinguish between positive and negative activation, where the former 
involves stronger emphasis on human capital formation and the latter on sanctions (Clasen and 
Clegg, 2006). Some comparative evidence suggest that in connection to social assistance, 
activation (or workfare) often tend to be preventive in character, thus focusing more on 
dependency and the reinforcement of individual responsibilities than on structural forces 
operating at societal level (Trickey, 2001). Thus workfare further increases the dualization of 
social protection into insurance and assistance policies. Since social assistance is designed to 
help the most vulnerable groups there is a class gradient not only when it comes to the size of 
benefits provided to citizens, but also in relation to workfare. Better of citizens usually qualify 
for more generous social insurance benefits, often complemented by occupational and private   7
alternatives. These programs are often surrounded by less harsh conditions and sanctions than 
those typically attached to workfare.   
  Workfare programs have certainly helped social assistance recipients to move from 
dependency on the welfare state into employment. For many observers there is also something 
logically appealing about the idea of workfare. First and foremost, citizens should work, or at 
least show that they are willing to take on paid employment. Only if this cannot be achieved 
should social welfare be an option. This work-related character distinguishes workfare programs 
from the unconditional and non-targeted basic income guarantees discussed in research. 
Workfare is also distinctively different from the employment strategy, which has been a 
prominent feature of labor market policy in the Nordic countries during much of the post-war 
period.  In Sweden, for example, labor market policy combined measures to stimulate both the 
demand for and the supply of labor. In addition, emphasis was placed on job matching. If 
activation per se is viewed in isolation from constituent parts of the Nordic employment strategy, 
it can sometimes be difficult to demarcate precisely when activation turns into workfare 
(Drøpping et al., 1999). Taken as a whole, however, the traditional Nordic employment strategy 
places less emphasis solely on individual factors for welfare dependency. Poverty is here 
recognized also to have important structural determinants. 
  There are reasons for us to be concerned about the widespread use of work-related 
obligations in social assistance. For example, it has been argued that one of the main ideas of 
workfare is to change the nature of workers rather than to stimulate the development of flexible 
labor markets and enhance the quality of work life (Gilbert, 2005). Worries are raised that 
workfare undermine the working conditions of low qualified labor, for example, by creating 
downward pressures on market wages and stimulate the development of low-wage employment   8
(Grover and Stewart, 1999; Schragge, 1997). Workfare also marks a departure from the less 
stigmatizing and repressive principles that played a part in the abolishment of the old poor relief. 
This seems especially to be the case if work-related activities are used more as a means to force 
citizens off the welfare rolls than to strengthen their human capital (Torjman, 1996).
3  One might 
even argue that in cases where work-related requirements are used more as sticks than carrots, 
workfare can to some extent be viewed as the old poor relief in a new guise (Schragge, 1997). It 
should be noted that one prominent objective of the British Poor Law of 1834 was to make relief 
for the undeserving and able-bodied poor so unpleasant that they stopped claiming it; the so-
called less eligibility approach (Stitt, 1994). This resemblance between workfare and the old 
poor relief becomes even more evident if social assistance benefits have also been curtailed (as 
observed elsewhere, see Nelson, 2008), thus giving recipients more reason to take on even low-
paid employment.  
  If activation is used in conjunction with downsized benefits to cut social expenditure and 
increase work incentives, rather than to provide resources to bridge structural gaps between 
supply and labor market demand, workfare may be in conflict with the idea of just social 
minimums. White (2003: 134), for example, includes income adequacy as the first requirement 
of a fair work-test.
4 Income adequacy refers here to the degree to which citizens have access to 
                                                 
3 The positive effects of workfare on the employability of social assistance recipients is also inconclusive at best 
(Lödemel, 2002). 
4 Workfare may conflict with the construction of just social minimums on even more counts. Several scholars have 
argued that one of the most fundamental consequences of workfare is the subsequent transformation of social 
citizenship, which instead of an equality of status becomes a contract (Ferrera and Rhodes, 2000; Handler, 2005). 
Since part of this contract stipulates that welfare clients repeatedly have to prove that they are unable to get a job, 
welfare contractualism may in its most extreme versions damage self-respect and self-worth (Wolff, 2003). 
Workfare may in this respect conflict with justice-based considerations concerning the design of social policy. 
Potential damage to welfare recipients’ mental well-being is here more appreciated than contributions made to the 
common good (White, 2004). It should be remembered here that Rawls defined five primary goods to be distributed 
by the principles of justice: liberty, opportunity, income, wealth, and self-respect. Of these, the social basis of self-
respect is held to be the most important (Ralws, 1971: 440).    9
benefits at levels sufficient to escape financial poverty. If workfare translates into lower social 
benefits for welfare recipients, the greater emphasis on activation in social assistance may have 
negative consequences for the construction of just social minimums. In the empirical analyses 
that follow I assess whether this applies to social assistance in relation to the provision of 
adequate minimum payments.   
 
Gender dimensions of social minimums 
There seems to be a consensus in the literature that welfare states broadly tend to reproduce and 
reinforce existing gendered divisions of labor (Meyer, 1990; Lewis, 1992; Orloff, 1993; Gordon, 
1994; Sainsbury, 1996). More recently it has been argued that the trend toward selectivity and 
individual responsibility in the provision of social protection also involves important gender 
dimensions. Orloff (2002) argues that activation is one part of a wider policy package that is 
built around the assumption of a gender-neutral distribution of paid and unpaid work. In this 
adult worker model family, both women and men are assumed to be working on the formal labor 
market (Lewis, 2001).
5 For some women, especially lone mothers, gainful employment can be 
problematic, especially if the associated issues of cash support for child leave and the provision 
of childcare facilities is not publicly recognized and provided for. Countries differ greatly here. 
Whereas childcare provision in the Nordic countries has largely been transferred to the formal 
labor market, the development of public childcare facilities in Continental Europe and the non-
European English speaking welfare democracies is still limited. Substantial cross-country 
differences do exists in relation to the generosity of parental leave and child benefits as well 
                                                 
5 The adult worker model is associated with at least two problems. The problem of limited child care facilities is 
recognized above. Another problem is the increased or double burden placed on working mothers, who often carry 
out most of the unpaid care work in the family (Giullari and Lewis, 2005).    10
(Korpi, 2000). The extent to which welfare state policies reproduce gender inequality is, of 
course, in part influenced by such institutional structures of both cash and care (e.g. Ferrarini, 
2006).  
  The move from passive to active social assistance policies is sometimes believed to be 
detrimental to the emancipation of women, and especially solo mothers (Michaud, 2005). For 
example, Chunn and Gavigan (2004) argue that workfare principles change the perception of 
single-mother recipients from the deserving to the undeserving poor. Poverty is mainly viewed as 
an individual problem with individualized solutions, basically found on the labor market by 
working full-time hours without necessary considerations to caring responsibilities. In most 
industrialized welfare democracies, lone mothers are expected to work (Lewis and Hobson, 
1997). Work tests for lone parents are increasingly being implemented in social assistance 
regulations. Among a group of 22 OECD countries in 2000, lone parents were exempt from work 
obligations in only seven countries (Bradshaw and Finch, 2005). It could even be said that 
marriage is the best way for lone mothers to escape poverty in the era of workfare. In reality, of 
course, lone parenthood is not always associated with poverty. Even for lone parents applying for 
social assistance and related minimum income benefits, in some countries formalized work tests 
only apply when the children reach a certain age. In some countries the work test for lone parents 
only applies to part-time work, and so forth. However, lone parents are generally at greater risk 
than others of poverty in most industrial welfare democracies (Smeeding and Sandström, 2005; 
Mishra et al., 2007; Brady and Kall, 2008). In several countries, lone parents are also 
disproportionately represented as recipients of social assistance (Ruspini, 1998).  
  In some countries, most notably the English-speaking welfare states, the undeserving lone 
mother has been a prominent feature of the poverty debate for many years. Single mothers are   11
stigmatized in a variety of ways. Sometimes they are accused of receiving excessive amounts of 
social benefits. Un-married mothers can also be portrayed as morally decadent and lazy (see 
Thomas, 1998). The extent to which moral judgments such as these are manifested in program 
regulations is unclear. Workfare for lone parents can be seen as a formalized expression of the 
moral conceptions about lone motherhood that often exist.
6 In addition to greater work 
obligations, governments may also have introduced special social assistance rates for lone 
parents. If lone parents are viewed as less deserving or even undeserving, we would expect social 
assistance to be less protective of the financial needs of lone mothers than of those social groups 
with a more positive image.  
  In this paper I will subject the hypothesis that there are deeply-rooted institutional gender 
inequalities in social assistance standards to empirical tests. In doing so, I will disaggregate the 
larger issue of benefit adequacy into questions pertaining to the treatment of different family 
constellations. This allows us to investigate the extent to which social assistance regulations take 
into account the varying needs of households of different types and size. This will enable us to 
assess the strength and weakness of social assistance for lone mothers.   
 
Replacement rates and benefit adequacy  
Evaluations of social benefits are often based on levels of entitlement. One common strategy for 
making benefit levels comparable across countries and over time is to use replacement rates, 
which are calculated by relating the level of statutory entitlements to some measure of income 
from work. Replacement rates have been used to compare the level of social insurance (see 
Korpi, 1989; Palme, 1990) and the level of social assistance across countries (see Eardley et al., 
                                                 
6 Typically the development from passive to active welfare policy is described in relation to high unemployment and 
tightened budget constraints.   12
1996; OECD, 1998a; OECD, 1998b; OECD, 1999; Kilkey and Bradshaw, 1999; Gough, 2001; 
Behrendt, 2002; Bradshaw and Finch, 2002).  
  Whereas the theoretical basis for using replacement rates in connection with social 
insurance is quite evident, the strategy to relate social assistance to work income is less obvious. 
Social insurance aims to provide income security for lost wages. Social assistance is not 
necessarily intended to uphold standard incomes. In most countries one core objective is rather to 
provide levels of subsistence that facilitate a move out of poverty, although the exact definition 
of poverty may differ among countries and over time. Sometimes, however, benefits are believed 
insufficient to provide even for a modicum of social needs, and thus incapable to reduce poverty. 
The development of social assistance in the United Kingdom since the early 1940s and up to the 
late 1970s, at least, is one example of this (Veit-Wilson’s, 1992). Nevertheless, even in such 
extreme cases, social assistance is intended at least to mitigate very low household incomes and 
reduce poverty gaps. Moreover, there is often a ‘distance of legitimacy’ between insurance and 
assistance, whereby citizens in receipt of social insurance provisions are better off than those 
receiving social assistance (Nelson, 2005). Social assistance replacement rates are sometimes 
interpreted differently from social insurance replacement rates. Since there is no natural link with 
loss of work income, social assistance replacement rates concern more the unintended 
consequences of social benefits rather than the intended effects of policy reform. The former 
interpretation is also used by the OECD (2002) and refers to the potential negative and 
incremental effects of benefits on work incentives and labor supply. Such comparisons with 
work income can in some instances be very misleading. Whereas social insurance rights are 
established at individual level in most countries, social assistance entitlements are generally 
designed to cater for household needs. If social assistance is evaluated in relation to work   13
income, benefit entitlements should accordingly be compared to the earnings potential of the 
whole family, which is not that common in the literature.  
  In order to evaluate whether social assistance fulfills one of its core objectives, namely to 
mitigate economic hardship, it can be more appropriate to analyze benefit entitlements in relation 
to certain pre-defined poverty thresholds. Although replacement rates can be computed for 
households with different income levels, and thus show how well specific social protection 
programs respond to the needs and demands of households across different socio-economic 
strata, the alternative strategy proposed in this paper is to compare benefit levels with the overall 
income distribution. This exercise evaluates how far up the income distribution social assistance 
reaches. Whereas replacement rates show the extent to which social insurance entitlements are 
sufficient to mitigate losses in normal earnings, the distance between social assistance and the 
poverty threshold of an income distribution shows how well last-resort safety nets provide 
adequate protection against poverty.  
  Most comparative welfare state studies on income distributions define poverty in relative 
terms and as certain fractions of the median income in each country, after taking account of 
differences in household size (Jäntti and Danziger, 2000). In this study benefit adequacy is 
defined in terms of percentages of such median incomes. Thus, the adequacy of social assistance 
is measured by relating the size of benefits of the three type-cases included in SaMip to the 
national equivalized disposable income of the total population in each country. By this token it is 
possible to relate social assistance adequacy rates to the social inclusion process at European 
level, where the EU member states have agreed to define financial poverty by similar loincome 
standards (Atkinson et al., 2005; European Commission, 2006). Previous studies on social 
assistance have used equivalent definitions of benefit adequacy (Behrendt, 2002; Nelson, 2003;   14
Kuivalainen, 2004; European Commission, 2006), although lack of institutional data has not 
allowed for such longitudinal and broad comparative approaches that are used in this paper. 
  The methodology applied here may seem a bit arbitrary and have limited relevance for 
establishing levels of living necessary to achieve a minimum of human dignity and decency. 
Other types of approaches to evaluate benefit adequacy, such as normative expert judgments (see 
Parker 1998; Bernstain et al., 2000) or consensual assessments (Middleton, 2000), are perhaps 
better equipped for such sociological explorations, although both these methods have their own 
distinct problems and shortcomings (see Walker, 2005). Perhaps most important to note here is 
that both normative and consensual assessments are difficult to use in studies that are both 
temporal and cross-national in character. Particularly this applies to situations where a greater 
number of countries are analyzed. However, the methodology chosen in this paper should not be 
equated to a second best alternative. The computation of social assistance adequacy rates relates 
to common procedures in similar research areas and the rates entail policy relevance not the least 
in connection to European developments.  
  Since there are few binding social policy regulations at EU-level, countries are of course 
free to use other types of indicators and thresholds to define income adequacy nationally. 
Nevertheless, the agreements made at EU level indicate that all member states recognize the 
needs of applying common income standards in order to combat poverty and social exclusion in 
Europe. In this process it is important to assess whether last resort payments, in particular social 
assistance, have the ability to raise households above these common standards. 
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Data: SaMip and LIS 
The analyses of the adequacy of social assistance in this paper combine data from two sources: 
the Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset (SaMip) and the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). SaMip is a new comparative dataset that gives unique 
possibilities to study social assistance across a large number of countries and over time, thereby 
facilitating analyses of social change. The dataset is designed specifically for cross-national 
research and it contains comparative indicators of the level of social assistance and related 
minimum income benefits for a large number of countries and years (Nelson, 2007a). 
Institutional social assistance data is derived from national legislation and regulations, and 
indicators have been collected on the basis of a type-case approach (for similar approaches see 
Korpi, 1989, 2001; Korpi and Palme, 1998). Three typical household types are used: a single 
person, a two-parent family and a lone-parent with two children. Social assistance is defined as 
the benefit package available to the three type-cases, who are assumed to lack work income and 
entitlement to contributory social insurance benefits. This benefit package include housing 
benefits, child benefits, and refundable tax credits for which these household types may be 
eligible, together with standard rates of social assistance. 
  The social assistance standard rates are from the following programs; Special Benefit in 
Australia, Sozialhilfe in Austria, Minimex in Belgium, General Assistance and Ontario Works in 
Canada, Social Bistand in Denmark, Living Allowance in Finland, Revenue Minimum d’Insertion 
in France, Sozialhilfe in Germany, Supplementary Welfare Allowance in Ireland, Minimo Vitale in 
Italy, Public Assistance in Japan, Algemene Bijstand in the Netherlands, Unemployment 
Assistance  in New Zealand, Sosialhjelp in Norway, Ingreso Minimo and Renta Mínima de   16
Inserción in Spain, Socialbidrag in Sweden, Aide Sociale  in Switzerland, Income Support and 
Job Seekers Allowance in the United Kingdom, Food Stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families in the USA.  
  In some countries the standard rates of social assistance show some regional variation. This 
applies to Germany, where the average level of social assistance guaranteed by the federal states 
is used here. Madrid is used to calculate social assistance benefits in Spain. In both Sweden (until 
1998) and Swizerland, the level of social assistance is based on national guidelines. In Austria 
and Canada, benefit scale rates reflect those in Vienna and Ontario, while Michigan is used for 
the United States. The Italian data on social assistance should be treated with extra caution due to 
extensive regional differences. Here, data refers to benefit rates effective in Milan. The scale 
rates of social assistance also vary geographically in Finland and Japan. In the present study the 
highest rated bands are used. For Norway, social assistance expenditure data is used. Beside 
social assistance standard rates, another important part of the benefit package of low income 
households is various forms of housing benefits. In countries where housing benefits are related 
to the rent expenditure of the household, entitlements for housing benefits are estimated on the 
basis of actual rents for respective family type.   
  The rent levels in SaMip are based on Eardley et al. (1996), where national informants 
in various countries reported the rent level for different sized apartments in 1992. For the 
one-person household, a one bedroom apartment is used. For the lone parent type-case, a 
two bedroom apartment is used. Finally, for the two-parent family, a three bedroom 
apartment is used. In order to obtain data for each year between 1990 and 2000, these rent 
levels have been adjusted in line with movements in the rent indices published by ILO 
Bureau of Statistics.    17
  LIS includes national micro-level income surveys and registers, which have been 
harmonized to allow cross-country income distribution comparisons (Smeeding, 2002). 
Harmonization is used by the LIS team to facilitate cross-national research on micro level 
income data. LIS micro level data are preferred instead of OECD macro level data for several 
reasons. For example, LIS data allow modifications to the national data sets in order to increase 
comparability. Another reason is greater possibilities for sensitivity analyses, such as using 
different methods to compare income across households of different size. Each harmonized 
national dataset in LIS includes income information for at least 2,800 households. The specific 
variable of interest in LIS is household net disposable income, which is pre-constructed in the 
database. Household net disposable income is defined as the sum of employment income, 
occupational pensions, transfer income less income taxes, and mandatory social security 
contributions. In the calculation of median incomes we follow the standard procedure of using 
both population and household weights. In order to adjust income across households of different 
size we use the square root equivalence scale, according to which household disposable income 
is divided by the square root of the number of household members. Nowadays, the square root 
scale is the most common procedure for adjusting income estimates for differences in household 
size and needs.  
  The following LIS datasets were used in the empirical analyses: Australia (1989, 1995, 
2001), Austria (1994, 1995, 1997), Bel (1992, 1995, 2000); Canada (1991, 1994, 2000); 
Denmark (1992; 1995, 2000), Finland (1991, 1995, 2000), France (1989, 1994, 2000), Germany 
(1989, 1994, 2000), Ireland (1994, 1995, 2000), Netherlands (1991, 1994, 1999), Norway (1991, 
1995, 2000), Spain (1990, 1995, 2000), Sweden (1992, 1995, 2000), Switzerland (1992, 2000), 
United Kingdom (1991, 1995, 1999), and the United States (1991, 1994, 2000).   18
  There are some comparability problems with Swedish income data for adults who are not 
yet living independently. In the original Swedish income surveys, all people over 18 years of age 
and still living with their parents were treated as independent households. Since these persons are 
often students with no or limited income, the number of Swedish households with low income is 
overestimated. To reduce this problem we have for each country excluded households where the 
head is below 25 years of age.  
 
Results  
Welfare state expansion came to a halt in the mid-1980s. Although the most basic welfare state 
structures remain intact, most countries have to various degrees introduced social policy 
cutbacks (Montanari et al., 2007). Social assistance is no exception (Nelson, 2007b). The precise 
consequences of welfare state retrenchment for the adequacy of social assistance are less 
apparent. The effects of inadequate social assistance standards are clearer. If social assistance is 
provided at levels that are insufficient for effective poverty alleviation, it is difficult to regard 
fairness and justice as important hallmarks of contemporary welfare states.   
 
Benefit rates and income poverty 
Is social assistance adequate for effective poverty alleviation? Figure 1 shows the adequacy of 
social assistance in 2000 for the single person type-case, the lone-parent household, and the two-
parent family.
7 Results based on the old and modified OECD equivalence scales do not 
substantially alter the main conclusions; see the sensitivity analyses reported in appendix A. 
                                                 
7 Greece and Portugal, which are included in the most recent version of the SaMip dataset, are not analyzed here. 
Greece has not implemented any generalized minimum income benefits of the type considered in this analysis, while 
Portugal is not covered by the Luxembourg Income Study.      19
Benefits often provide far from sufficient protection against poverty. On average, social 
assistance is provided at levels between 40 and 45 percent of median income, which is below the 
poverty thresholds of 50 percent most often applied in comparative income distribution studies. 
There are quite large differences between countries. For the family with two children, for 
example, benefits range between 59 percent of the median income in Denmark and Norway and 
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Figure 1. Adequacy of Social Assistance for three Household Types in 16 countries, around 2000. 
Note: Adequacy = (Equivalized Social Assistance Benefits for respective Household Type / 
Equivalized Disposable Income in Total Population) * 100. MDI=Equivalized Median Disposable 
Income
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  Only in Norway does social assistance guarantee an income above the 60 percent poverty 
threshold. The single person type case is here granted benefits reaching 65 percent of the median 
income.
8 In the remaining countries benefits are most often below the 60 percent poverty 
threshold. This finding is quite remarkable, especially for the European countries. Since the early 
1990s at least the European Union has increasingly become engaged in the fight against poverty 
and social exclusion in the member states. The 60 percent poverty threshold has consequently 
been adopted as one of the benchmarks to evaluate the functioning of social policy across the 
Union.
9 The results presented here must be seen as something of a failure for Social Europe and 
for the attempts made at the supranational level to place social issues higher up the European 
political agenda.  
  It is evident that social assistance in the three non-European countries looked at in this 
study also fails to raise household income above the 60 percent poverty threshold. The results for 
the United States are in line with those of Spain, with adequacy rates far below the average.
10 
The situation in Australia is somewhat better, with adequacy rates around average. Canada is 
located between Australia and the United States in this rank-order, providing adequacy rates 
slightly below average. 
                                                 
8 The figure for Norway may be somewhat misleading in comparison with the other countries. Instead of program 
regulations, minimum income benefit rates in the Norwegian case are estimated on the basis of expenditure data 
supplied by Statistics Norway. This property may over-estimate benefits in Norway, since also one-off payments 
and social assistance supplements are included in the benefit package.  
9 The 60 percent income threshold used to be defined as the low income rate (Social Protection Committee, 2001). 
After the revision of the commonly agreed indicators on poverty and social exclusion it is referred to as the “at risk 
of” poverty rate (European Commission, 2006). Since this statistic includes not only families with income slightly 
below this rate but also ones with an income well below 60 percent of median income, the term “at risk of” poverty 
is somewhat misleading.  
10 In the income matrix for the SaMip dataset the single person type-case in the United States is only eligible for 
food stamps, which results in an extremely low adequacy rate. Low-income households with children in the United 
States receive an additional benefit. Since it is assumed that households lack work-income, the US type-cases in 
SaMip are not eligible for the earned income tax credit.    21
  The ranking of the three non-European countries are interesting in further aspects. There is 
a lively discussion about the creation of a single European social model (Ebbinghaus, 1999; 
Scharpf, 2002; Montanari et al., 2007). Although it is clear from this debate that the model 
implies many different things, I would here stress that the model is both a vision about common 
social objectives and an attempt to distinguish certain institutional characteristics of the 
European welfare states. Social assistance is an important element in this discussion. For 
example, Anna Diamantopoulou (2003), EU Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs 
1999-2004, argue that the European social model is an attempt to establish reasonable minimum 
standards for social protection. At the moment however, differences in social assistance 
adequacy rates seem to be greater than this model implies. Neither is it possible to identify 
certain European patterns in this regard. Except for the United States, social assistance adequacy 
rates in the non-European countries is approximately similar to many European countries  
  If we lower the expectations somewhat and concentrate on the 50 percent poverty threshold 
the results improve, although many countries still provide far from adequate benefits at levels 
sufficient to reduce poverty. The two-parent family receives on average the most adequate 
benefits, although the difference between the lone parent and the single person household is quite 
small. The difference between the two-parent family and the single person type case is intuitively 
reasonable. Families with children are generally seen as more deserving of public support than 
households without caring responsibilities. Similarly, childless families are more often perceived 
as capable of earning their way out of poverty (van Oorschot, 2000). The potential influence of 
public opinion does not seem to have benefited lone parents because there is on average no great 
difference between the lone parent and the single person household.    22
  In order to more thoroughly evaluate the treatment of lone parents and potential gender 
dimensions in the level of benefits, we can compare the situation of the lone parent household 
with that of the two-parent family (Nelson, 2007a). This reveals that most governments do not 
treat lone parents and two-parent families particularly differently. Only in five countries is the 
adequacy rate of the lone parent household more than five percentage points below that of the 
two-parent family, namely Australia, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden.
11 Of these, 
Australia, Denmark and Norway are clearly three extreme cases, where the difference between 
the lone parent type-case and the two-parent family is more than ten percentage points.   
  The results presented in this section are both disappointing and promising. They are 
disappointing with regard to poverty alleviation since it is difficult for social assistance to reach 
the poverty thresholds most often used in this type of analysis. If income adequacy is one 
precondition for a fair work test to apply, social assistance fails to achieve this goal. Just social 
minimums are therefore absent in the social security machinery of contemporary welfare states. 
However, the findings are more promising in terms of the treatment of particular household 
categories. In only a handful of countries do lone parents, among whom the clear majority is solo 
mothers, receive the least adequate benefits. Moral judgments about the deservingness of lone 
mothers do not, therefore, seem to have had any major influence on the differentiation of social 
assistance standards in the majority of countries.  
 
Dismantled protection against poverty 
Social assistance is not as generous as it used to be. Benefits have been curtailed in most 
countries and one can observe a trend towards less adequate benefits. However, there has not 
                                                 
11 The two alternative equivalence scales above strengthen the position of lone parents somewhat but do not impact 
on the overall findings.     23
been a steady and continuous reduction in benefit adequacy since 1990. Figure 2 shows changes 
in social assistance adequacy rates since the early 1990s.
12 These are determined by movements 
in disposable income and entitlement levels. Figure 2 also shows how the numerator and 
denominator have changed since the early 1990s. Country averages are used and the base year is 
set around 1990. Unweighted averages of the three type-case households are used for social 
















Figure 2. Changes in Equaivalized Disposable Median Income in Total Population, Size of Social 
Assistance, and the Adequacy of Social Assistance in 16 Countries, 1990-2000, Index 1990=100. 
Note: Median DPI and Adequacy rates are estimates around 1990, 1995, and 2000. LIS includes no 
income data for Switzerland in the mid-1990s.
Source: SaMip  and LIS.
 
                                                 
12 Since this evaluation concerns changes in adequacy rates, the results are less sensitive to the scale of equivalence 
used.  
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The most significant changes in adequacy rates occurred in the second half of the 1990s, when 
disposable income increased faster than the level of benefits. During the first half of the 1990s 
benefit adequacy rates were more stable. During this period, social assistance rates rose even 
faster than disposable income, although the rise in benefits was not enough to actually provide 
assistance above the poverty threshold. The unvaried adequacy levels in the first half of the 
1990s has less to do with institutional improvements than the slower growth of disposable 
income in the aftermath of the global economic recessions of the late-1980s and early-1990s. 
Benefits were not up-rated to a substantially greater degree in the first half of the 1990s than in 
the second half. It was rather wage developments that changed, with the years 1990 to 1995 
characterized by less improvement in disposable income in the total population than in the period 
1995-2000.  
  There are some noticeable differences between countries. Figure 3 shows changes in the 
adequacy of social assistance for two periods, 1990-1995 and 1995-2000, for each country. Once 
again, an un-weighted average of benefits for the three type-cases is used. The analysis reveals 
no substantial differences between household types and Italy is the only country with positive 
figures for both periods. However, the Italian case should be evaluated with considerable caution 
due to large regional differences in benefit amounts. The Italian figures reported in this paper are 
only valid for Milan. In some parts of Italy there are still no general means-tested social 
assistance benefits in operation.  
  Developments in the other countries were not as promising. In a large number of them, 
adequacy rates improved during the first half of the 1990s, after which they started to deteriorate. 
These countries are Australia, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the   25
United Kingdom. Austria and France show the opposite trend, with better protection against 
poverty 1995-2000, but poorer adequacy rates in the first half of the 1990s. Five countries 
demonstrate negative figures for both periods, namely Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, and 
the United States. However, both Canada and the United States are very close to the cross-over 






































Figure 3. Changes in Adequacy of Social Assistance in 16 Countries, 1990-1995 and 1995-2000. 
Average of Benefit Adequacy for Three Household Types: Single Person, Lone Parent, and Two-
Parent Family.
Note: Estimates around 1990, 1995, and 2000. LIS includes no income data for Switzerland in 
the mid-1990s.
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  Some countries have had particularly noteworthy developments. Ireland is one example, 
where benefit adequacy fell by more than 15 percent during both periods. The figures for Ireland 
are quite remarkable since the Irish government substantially increased the scale rates of the 
Supplementary Welfare Allowance and the Lone Parent’s Allowance in the 1990s. For example, 
between 1990 and 2000 the Supplementary Allowance was raised by 52 percent for a single 
person. The increase was 38 percent for a lone parent. In the other countries the average benefit 
increase was 6 percent for the same household type in the same period. The main reason why 
benefit increases in Ireland did not translate into better protection against poverty is that wages 
rose even faster during the boom in the Irish economy in the 1990s. Over this decade, Irish 
wages more than tripled in absolute terms (OECD 2006). This type of explanation also applies to 
Spain, where the adequacy of social assistance also deteriorated in the 1990s, with wages almost 
doubling.   
  Canada and Sweden are two other countries with exceptional trends, albeit not to the same 
extent as in Ireland. In both Canada and Sweden adequacy rates fell by about 13 percentage 
points in the second half of the 1990s. The developments in Sweden and Canada differ from 
Ireland in so far as benefits were curtailed in absolute terms in the two former countries. In 
Sweden the Social Welfare Allowance was subject to major reform in 1998. In Canada General 
Assistance was substantially reduced in 1995 and a few years later when Ontario Works replaced 
the former system of benefits (Nelson, 2003).     
 
Discussion 
Is social assistance organized in accordance with an egalitarian and liberal understanding of 
social justice? This was the question raised in the introduction to this paper. There is obviously   27
more to this question than offered by the empirical analyses in this paper. Nevertheless, we can 
conclude that the need to fight poverty and economic hardship continues to be a major challenge 
for contemporary welfare states. Despite the implementation of extensive systems of social 
protection, poverty has not been eradicated or transformed into a marginal problem. It is 
estimated that almost 16 percent of European Union citizens are now poor or at risk of poverty 
(EUROSTAT, 2006). In the English-speaking welfare democracies outside Europe this figure is 
even higher (LIS, 2007).  
  Low-income targeting is still considered by many welfare state observers to be an effective 
strategy for reducing poverty (see Freeman et al., 2006). It is therefore puzzling to note that 
poverty has increased in many countries, despite the growing emphasis on low-income targeting 
within the overall design of social protection. Among the 17 countries analyzed in this paper, 
poverty increased on average by about 5 percentage points from the early 1990s to the turn of the 
new millennium (LIS, 2007). These new patterns in the distribution of income force us to 
reconsider the role of social assistance for poverty alleviation, particularly if the fight against 
poverty is to continue to be a main government objective of the industrialized welfare 
democracies.   
  In this paper we have shown that benefits are often insufficient for effective poverty 
alleviation, at least when social assistance adequacy rates are evaluated on the basis of the near 
poverty threshold agreed by the EU member states. Even if we lower the income standard and 
compare benefits against the ‘50 per cent of median’ threshold commonly used in comparative 
income distribution research, social assistance adequacy rates are in many countries below the 
poverty line. In most countries, citizens of working age and relying on benefits for a whole year 
are condemned to live in poverty by the standards used in this paper. This finding does not   28
support the continued reliance on low-income targeting as an important redistributive instrument 
for the advanced welfare democracies. It is also doubtful whether benefits that fail to bring 
households out of poverty can be equated with the social minimums which Rawls (1971) 
originally had in mind. Although Rawls does not specify how much income the social minimum 
was to guarantee, it seems fair to assume that it should at very least take recipients above the 
poverty line. This requirement has not become less important in the face of the increased 
conditionality of social assistance. Income adequacy is one important condition that has to be 
achieved for a fair work test to apply. This criterion is far from satisfied today by social 
assistance in several of the countries under study. In order for social assistance to be truly 
effective in reducing poverty, benefits must be substantially increased, in some countries by at 
least 20-40 percent. Just social minimums are on this account absent from the social policy 
arsenal of the advanced welfare democracies.  
  It is beyond this paper to develop and test explanations for long-term trends in social 
assistance benefit adequacy and cross-national differences. Here, we may only speculate about 
potential causes of cross country differences in institutional design. Elsewhere I have argued that 
one obstacle to improvements in the level of social assistance are inadequate minimum wages 
and institutional restrictions in first-tier social protection programs, most notably social insurance 
(Nelson, 2005). First-tier social insurance benefits often restrict how much social assistance can 
be improved (Nelson, 2006). For example, the “distance of legitimacy” between social insurance 
and social assistance implies that assistance benefits cannot easily be paid at levels above social 
insurance. In countries where social insurance provisions are provided in the form of flat-rate 
amounts or are only weakly earnings-related, substantial social policy reforms may be required 
for social assistance to become an effective instrument in the fight against poverty. Such reforms   29
might, for example, involve a redesign of safety nets to substantially improve the degree of 
income security. Such a re-organization may have additional benefits. For example, it may 
strengthen social protection long term by increasing public support for redistributive policies, 
irrespective of whether it is horizontal or vertical in character (Korpi and Palme, 1998). This 
would most likely also spill over to social assistance, thereby making it easier for governments to 
allocate the funds necessary to raise benefits also for the lower income segments of the 
population.  
  Another reflection on the results presented in this study concerns the long-term 
development of social assistance. One reason why social assistance has become less adequate for 
reducing poverty is that wages and disposable income have risen faster than benefits. To avoid 
an erosion of benefits in the long term, benefits should be tied to the development of wages. 
Most countries today have instead indexed benefits to price developments, which makes little 
sense as far as relative poverty is concerned. This also holds for other types of adjustment 
mechanisms that link benefits to consumption patterns, rather than prices, often among the 
lowest income segments of the population. One common misunderstanding about social 
assistance standards is that they are established with reference to absolute levels of living and 
thus cannot be evaluated by measures of relative poverty. This is not accurate, however, even in 
countries where social assistance is based on a basket-of-goods approach.  
  Most baskets-of-goods are established with close reference to living standards in society as 
a whole. The consumption items included in the basket-of-goods often reflect living standards of 
broadly defined income groups. In Sweden, for example, the consumption items included in the 
basket-of-goods for the Social Welfare Allowance and its predecessor the Poor Relief have 
changed several times along with increased living standards in the population at large. The   30
license fee for public television is one clear example. Another example is the inclusion of costs 
for newspapers. In the 1990s, in order to reduce social expenditure, some countries removed 
certain goods from this basket or down-rated the amount of household expenditure devoted to 
each item in this basket. This down-rating and re-basing of benefits has also occurred in 
countries where social assistance standards are based on other approaches than the basket-of-
goods. In Germany, for example, benefits for Sozialhilfe were curtailed when the government 
decided to move from a basket-of-goods to a consumption-based approach. Together with the 
introduction or strengthening of workfare principles in connection with the receipt of social 
assistance, this cutting of benefit levels may reflect the fact that governments tend to view the 
new types of conditional social assistance program as preventive rather than integrative measures 
for social inclusion.   
  In the literature focusing on the negative consequences of workfare there is some concern 
about the treatment of women and lone mothers. Some arguments are based on the recognition 
that workfare programs tend to be non-adoptive to the caring responsibilities of lone parents and 
the fear is raised that activation policies will increasingly place single mothers in the less 
deserving group of the welfare clientele. In this paper we have added new information to this 
discussion by investigating the extent to which social assistance differentiates between the needs 
of lone parents and other family constellations. Generally, we do not find any strong evidence 
that social assistance gives lone parents less generous levels of benefits than two-parent families. 
Other institutional aspects of social assistance may of course negatively influence the well-being 
of lone parents. For example, the greater emphasis on activation may prevent lone parents from 
claiming benefits in the first place.   31
  The results presented above on potential gender dimensions in the design of social 
assistance should not be confused with more general arguments relating to the way in which 
welfare states structure the life chances of women and men differently. Social assistance 
concerns only the residual part of modern systems of social protection. Much of the gender-
based inequality that exists in the industrialized welfare democracies occur independently of 
these schemes of last resort. Social assistance can do little to influence these fundamental forces 
of socio-economic stratification in society.  
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Appendix A 
The sensitivity analysis reported in Table A1 indicates that equivalization of disposable income 
does not alter the main conclusions to any great extent. Table A1 shows social assistance 
adequacy rates based on the old and modified OECD scales. The old OECD scale gives the first 
household member a weight of 1. Each additional adult receives 0.7, whereas each child receives 
a weight of 0.5. The modified OECD scale assigns additional adults and children weights of 0.5 
and 0.3, respectively. 
 
Table A1. Social Assistance Adequacy Rates for three Household Types in 17 countries. 
 
  Old OECD Scale  Modified OECD Scale 








Aus  64 41 44 52 41 46 
Aut  55 39 35 46 41 38 
Bel  48 45 33 40 46 35 
Can  35 43 34 29 45 36 
Den  64 52 56 53 54 60 
Fin  69 61 55 58 63 59 
Fra  51 41 35 42 42 37 
Ger  65 61 53 55 65 58 
Ire  58 46 45 45 45 45 
Ita  57 61 54 47 63 58 
Net  69 54 46 56 55 48 
Nor  85 48 56 70 50 59 
Spa  40 31 25 32 32 27 
Swe  64 54 51 54 57 55 
Swi  71 63 55 59 66 59 
UK  52 48 43 43 50 46 
USA  8 25  22 7 26  24 
 
Source: SaMip and LIS. 
 
  Compared to the square root scale used above, the old and modified OECD scales improve 
the results somewhat, insofar as a few more countries have adequacy rates above the 60 percent   33
poverty threshold. However, social assistance still fails to reach the 60 percent poverty threshold 
in the majority of the countries subjected to comparison. Among the 51 instances analyzed (17 
countries and 3 type-cases), the adequacy of social assistance is above 60 percent only in six 
cases when the modified OECD scale is used to equivalize income. When the old OECD scale is 
used, 10 cases have adequacy rates above 60 percent. Compared to the square root scale used 
above, the two OECD scales somewhat strengthen the position of lone parents, which supports 
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